Showing posts with label Salary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Salary. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 12, 2025

Two saves too many: how gambling has led to the NHL scrutinizing what is and what is not a shot on net

TLDR: Proliferation of sports gambling has enticed the NHL to scrutinize what is and what is not a ‘shot on net,’ resulting in fewer shots on net in 2024/25.

What does this mean for player stats and future compensation? Stayed tuned...


After a long hiatus for no particular reason, I have decided to drop a short post.

Shots on net are down 6% this NHL season (through the “All-Star” break) compared to last. Many things could be driving this result: more parity among teams, better equipment allowing for players to ‘safely’ block shots (a would-be shot on net does not count if it is blocked), change in the enforcement of penalties, fewer games going to overtime (2023-24 had the fewest percentage of games go to overtime in a season since the Matrix was released and the 2024-25 percentage is currently lower), or simply changes in gameplay (i.e., favouring quality shooting opportunities rather than quantity).

One reason—that is not heavily cited—is the growth of sports gambling. Specifically, the growing popularity of ‘prop bets’ (‘prop,’ short for ‘proposition’) has led to individuals wagering on how many shots a player, or saves a goalie, will register on a particular night.

The definition of a shot is a scoring attempt where the puck is directed towards the opposing net, resulting in either a goal or a save by the goalie. Previously, the NHL would record a shot on net even if the puck would have clearly missed the net if the goalie did not interrupt its path. Given that the league and many of its teams are partnered with a sportsbook, the league has applied more scrutiny to shot attempts. A stricter definition of shot of net is now any scoring attempt where the puck would necessarily result in a goal but for the goalie’s save. Instead of having an observer tally the number of shots on net according to their own assessment, the league is now using puck-tracking technology to determine whether a puck directed towards the net would have entered the net absent the goalie–harmless shots attempts that would have missed the net but were counted as a goalie’s save are now excluded from records.  

Below is the official number of shots per team, per game in the ‘Salary Cap Era’ (data from Hockey-Reference.com). 


There are two fewer shot attempts this season than last, breaking a general upwards sloping trend since the introduction of the salary cap. Shots were likely going to level off at some point, but what is telling is that the number of goalie saves per team per game has also declined by two.

What does this mean? Two saves removed from each goalie’s save percentage’s numerator and two shot attempts removed from its denominator means that, on average, goalie appear to have gotten worse, relative to the past few seasons. 

Past save percentages likely benefitted from having shots that would have been off-target being counted as saves. With the new save percentages, how will this affect free-agency compensation? What about arbitration? 

I challenge someone with more time and energy to solve this problem!

Tuesday, August 1, 2017

.299 hitters don't want to be discounted

TLDR: "The concept of psychological pricing and our perception of numbers ending in 99 is not unique to the grocery store. Undervaluing a baseball player with a batting average of .299 is consistent with this idea."

"[...] a player going into the final game of the season with a .299 batting average will aggressively chase the goal of hitting .300. [They] swing at 11 percentage points more pitches than the average batter [...] and swing at 63% of pitches on the last day of the season - all for the allure of the ending the season hitting .300"


Aside: In baseball, one of the most common metrics used to discuss the prominence of hitter is the batting average. The batting average is calculated as an individual's number of hits divided by the number of at bats and it is always represented as a three decimal number (e.g. if someone had 5 hits in 20 at bats, we would say he is hitting .250). In 2016 the MLB-wide batting average was .255.

How different is a .299 hitter from a .300 hitter? It turns out about $130 thousand per year. That is how much more money a Major League Baseball (MLB) player would expect to make on their next contract after just one more hit during the regular season.

Valuing .300 significantly more than .299 is consistent with the concept of psychological pricing - the reason why we always see a can of pop selling for $0.99 instead of $1.00. Humans tend to incorrectly perceive prices ending in .99 as meaningfully lower than those ending with one cent more. 

In the context of professional baseball, MLB players have to bargain for their wage from prospective teams as part of free agency. Part of the team's due diligence during contract negotiations requires mulling over the player's performance such as their batting average. (For an analogous discussion using the National Football League, see my earlier post). Previous research suggests MLB teams value a .300 hitter much more than .299 hitter (despite the negligible difference) and the former tends to receive a larger contract.

Alternatively, we might say that .300 is a reference point for which baseball players and general managers use as an anchor. The perceived value of a player is now measured against this standard of hitting .300: any player above this number are considered the masters of their craft and should be compensated accordingly.

In either case, we would expect a player sitting just shy of the .300 mark to show more aggression in their at bats to reach this achievement. One place we can look to test this idea is through the number of pitches these players are swinging at. Moreover, when the players know they are near their last chance to improve their batting average we would expect to see their aggression increase. Therefore, I chose to look at the number of pitches a player hitting .299 swings at on the final day of season.

I started by collecting all the pitches thrown on the final day of the regular seasons of 2014 to 2016 from Baseball Savant. Then I used Fan Graphs to identify which players begun the final day of the season hitting .299 and .300. (I term a player who goes into the final game hitting .299 a ".299 hitter", similar with .300 hitters). I then classify the reaction by the batter as either a swing, no swing, or neutral. Swings include putting the ball in play and swinging strikes - this is where the intention is to make contact for a hit. No swings are where the batter does not swing and includes balls and called strikes. Lastly, neutral reactions are when the outcome was already decided: intentional balls, wild pitches, pitch-outs, etc.

I remove the neutral reactions and I calculate the fraction of pitches that resulted in swings. I separate the data into three groups: .299 hitters, .300 hitters, and all hitters (regardless of batting average). The results are as follows:

With just one more hit needed to reach the .300-mark, .299 hitters are significantly more like to swing in their at bats. These .299 hitters swing at 53% of pitches, 11 percentage points more than a .300 hitter.

When we compare these .299 hitters against themselves, their own strategy completely flips on the last day of the season (using the 2016 data). Whereas they were swinging the bat on 38% of pitches for the majority of the season, these .299 hitters swing 63% of the time on the final day of the season.

The concept of psychological pricing and our perception of numbers ending in 99 is not unique to the grocery store. Undervaluing a baseball player with a batting average of .299 is consistent with this idea. Here I have demonstrated that a player going into the final game of the season with a .299 batting average will aggressively chase the somewhat arbitrary goal of hitting .300. 

Whether they are aware of the financial payoffs or they have set an internal reference point, .299 hitters swing at 11 percentage points more pitches than the average batter on the final day of the season. Moreover, while .299 hitters do not swing at 62% of pitches for the majority of the season, they swing at 63% of pitches on the last day of the season - all for the allure of the ending the season hitting .300!

If you like what you are reading, I would love to hear your feedback! Please like, share, and comment! 


Thursday, January 26, 2017

the cost of a concussion

In case you have not turned on a National Football League (NFL) broadcast in the past five years, concussions are becoming an ever-increasing hot button topic.  From 2011 to 2015, there were more than 1,200 formally diagnosed concussions during games and practices.  Yet, with all the talk about the epidemic of head injuries, there is still questions to be answered: the most pertinent to the economist being the effects of the injury on the wage of players.

My goal is to predict the effect of a concussion on future salary.  Before explaining the details of the estimation, here are some pieces of background information that are important to note:

- All players must be under contract before they play in the NFL.
- After four years of NFL service, players are free to negotiate with any of the 32 NFL teams for a contract (known as free agency).
- Anything else?

I compiled data from several sources to get a dataset of salaries from the 2013 to 2016 NFL free agency periods and then performance and concussion events from the 2012 to 2015 NFL seasons. There were 109 quarterback contracts signed in the 2013 to 2016 NFL free agency periods. Since concussion information was available only for the 2012 to 2015 NFL seasons, I considered only the concussion events that occur in a quarterback's final year of his contract. There were nine such occurrences.

I considered only quarterbacks for two reasons. First, there was a relative balance between the number of quarterback hires and the number of teams of the NFL in the sample period: with few substitutes, neither the buyer nor the seller of can have substantial bargaining power over the other. Second, there is a clear measure of productivity for the quarterback position: other positions have a wide menu of duties and/or their contribution is not easily quantifiable.

Consider the individual agent bargaining for his salary with a general manager. These negotiations are bounded by the individual's reservation wage (the minimum value he is willing to take in order to show up for work) and his marginal revenue product (MRP - the player's contribution to the employer's revenue). Denote this boundary as follows:

(1) ri,t ≤ wi,t ≤ MRPi,t

Since the NFL requires players to be under contract before they are eligible to play, the player and the team must negotiate a wage for period t+1 in period t, therefore the agreed upon wage is:

(2) wi,t+1 = MRPi,t+1 + renti,t+1

where the objective function of both parties is to maximize their respective rents. Note that at the time of the negotiation, MRP and rent are both unknown and therefore some sort of estimated value of future MRP is required, such as:

(3) E(MRPi,t+1) ≅ E(Performancei,t+1) = f(Performancei,t,Agei,t+1)

where future MRP is approximated by some performance measure(s). Predicting future performance is commonly referred to as estimating the aging curve.

To determine the wage of a player in the next period, I use information on the player at the time of contract negotiations. Combining the concepts of (2) and (3), I run the follow specification using OLS:

(4) ln(wagei,t+1) = f(Concussioni,t,ln(wagei,t),Performancei,t,Agei,t+1)

where ln(wagei,t+1) is the natural logarithm of the average annual salary of the player: the agreed upon wage. The quarterback's win percentage and the passer rating are used as measures of performance in period t. Age is the player's age at the time of signing the new contract and ln(wagei,t) is the natural logarithm of his current salary. I also consider the year in which the player signed the new contract.

A graphical depiction of the estimation is below. Here I have not yet separately controlled for the concussions in the regression. I plot the fitted values against the actual values. The hollow black circles represent a given quarterback contract. The red circles represent contracts signed following a season in which the quarterback had a concussion. Points above the black 45 degree line indicate the player signed a contract that was below expectations given his observable productivity. It becomes clear that the red dots appear only on or above the black line.


I then estimated the model described in (4). The results of this regression are shown below:

Variable Coefficient
Concussion -0.5385***
(-2.18)
Win% 1.7096***
(4.25)
Passer Rating 0.0053***
(2.71)
Previous Salary 0.5182***
(5.10)
Age -0.0447*
(-1.85)
Year FE Yes
Observations 109
Adjusted R2 0.685
Estimated Concussion Effect -39.8%
95% Confidence Interval (-69.8%,-9.8%)

The results are rather shocking - the implied effect of a concussion is found to have a -40% impact on the next salary of the player. However, recall that the above equation (3), and therefore equation (4), would require that the negotiated salary is always at least as great as the player's reservation wage and no greater than his MRP: alternatively stated as equation (1) always holds.

Now consider that there is no feasible bargaining range to satisfy (1). There may be a reason that some players were not offered contracts in the next period and we should be wary of a selection bias. In our sample period, there were 109 quarterback contracts signed but 152 player-contracts had expired. These 152-109 = 43 censored observations were used in addition to the 109 non-censored observations in a two-step Heckman model to remove the potential selection bias. In the first step, I estimate a probit model which predicts if a player will get a new contract using only performance and age. The results of this probit model are used in the second step OLS regression to correct for any potential selection bias. You can read up on this estimation technique here for more information.

Variable Coefficient
Concussion -0.5344***
(-2.15)
Win% 1.7075***
(4.25)
Passer Rating 0.0060*
(1.73)
Previous Salary 0.4034
(5.10)
Age -0.0263
(-0.38)
Year FE Yes
Observations 152
Adjusted R2 0.689
Estimated Concussion Effect -39.5%
95% Confidence Interval (-69.5%,-9.6%)


The results of the Heckman model do not change the output therefore the OLS regression likely did not suffer from selection bias. Again, a concussion is found to correlate to a 40% lower salary than would have otherwise been observed but-for the head injury. This is a huge impact but it leads me to several conclusions.

First, although the effect of a concussion is found to be negative and statistically significant, the range of the 95% confidence interval is massive. It is hard to understand what the true effect may be if the range is 60 percentage points. This issue should be corrected with more concussion data becoming available.

Secondly, this may be the first insight that the NFL managers are cautious of concussions. There may be some sort of stigma around a diagnosed concussion wherein a player will miss increasingly more time with each subsequent concussion. This is despite the evidence that individual performance is no different post-concussion compared to pre-concussion.

Lastly, money lost from concussions and injuries may be part of a larger zero-sum game. The teams of the NFL are subject to both salary floors and ceilings - there is a minimum and a maximum amount of money each team must allocate to it's players each year. If one player is paid below their estimated MRP, another player may be given more.

Thoughts? Comments? Thanks for reading.